Social movement theory has rarely been tested with counterfactual cases, that is, instances in which movements do not emerge. Moreover, contemporary theories about political opportunity and resources often inadequately address the issue of motivation. To address these shortcomings, this article examines 20 communities that are "at risk" for mobilization because they face controversial proposals for large energy infrastructure projects. Movements emerge in only 10 cases, allowing for the identification of factors that drive mobilization or nonmobilization. Utilizing insights from social psychology, the authors contend that community context shapes motivations to oppose or accept a proposal, not objective measures of threat. They conclude that the combination of community context-to understand motivation-and measures of capability is the best way to model movement emergence.
social movement research, Walder (2009) notes that early work focused on how structural features in society shaped political views and motivated various forms of collective action. He laments that later research has largely abandoned this question. Instead, scholars have focused on identifying structural conditions that make threatened groups capable of launching movements-an approach in line with scholarship on resource mobilization and political opportunity.
This emphasis on capability emerged during the 1970s when scholars sought to understand rights movements in which disadvantaged groups demanded equality through large-scale protest. The assumption was that groups that had been discriminated against had many grievances and therefore plenty of motivation. Deficiencies in terms of their capacity to mobilize (in the resource mobilization tradition; see Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McCarthy and Zald 1977) and the lack of political power or leverage (in the political opportunity tradition; see Eisinger 1973; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1994; Meyer 2004) were thought to be the cause of prior failures to mobilize. Though the theories differed, the reasoning was the same. A lack of capacity or a lack of political opportunity was thought to be a sufficient barrier to mobilization, resulting in the absence of significant movement activity. Only when disadvantaged groups gained capacity or political opportunities would they be capable of mobilizing. Thus, logically, these conditions were thought necessary for mobilization to occur.
The aforementioned statements about what is necessary for mobilization and sufficient for nonmobilization can be properly tested only using cases of both mobilization and nonmobilization. However, social movement scholars rarely study counterfactual cases because it is difficult to pinpoint places where movements might occur. Fortunately, the siting of large infrastructure projects creates a set of communities "at risk" for mobilization. Each community faces a threat associated with such a project and a decision about how to respond. Some communities launch opposition movements, but others do not. Thus, siting attempts provide a unique opportunity to explain cases of mobilization and nonmobilization by analyzing both motivation and capability.
When studies do take into account counterfactual cases, they often do not examine both motivation and capability. For example, Olzak, Shanahan, and West (1994) use conflict theory to explain antibusing action but do not consider whether variable response may also be due to a lack of resources or opportunities. Other studies assume that issues and threats are understood uniformly across communities (van Dyke and Soule 2002). We not only address both capability and motivation but also use insights from social psychology to suggest that the same potentially threatening issues may be evaluated differently across communities, thus triggering different levels of motivation and mobilization. The literature on framing examines different motivations, but it often fails to explain different evaluations relevant to movement emergence because it focuses on movement dynamics rather than features present prior to mobilization. To avoid this problem, we focus on elements of the community social structure that exist prior to the introduction of the threat and therefore independently shape motivations to mobilize.
The article proceeds with a brief overview of the regulatory process surrounding energy infrastructure proposals and how we used it for case selection. Next, we present a critique of the current literature and propose a new theory for conceptualizing motivation related to emergent movements. We then describe the data and methods used and provide descriptive case studies to illustrate our argument. Finally, we test the comparative efficacy of models that include measures of both capability (political opportunity and civic capacity) and motivation, showing that community conditions are better indicators of motivation than threats associated with the proposal.
ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE PROPOSALS
Energy infrastructure projects are almost always proposed by private companies. They include onshore and offshore liquefied natural gas, nuclear, hydroelectric, and wind projects. These projects present many issues around which a community could mobilize in opposition, including safety hazards, environmental impacts, and threats to property values and quality of life. Energy infrastructure projects also have positive impacts. They can provide significant economic rewards to the local community in the form of tax revenue and, to a lesser extent, employment. Given these potential costs and benefits, it is unclear whether community members will support or oppose a project.
The first opportunity for the public to assess proposals and coordinate responses arises during the environmental impact statement (EIS) process. The National Environmental Protection Policy Act requires the preparation and public dissemination of EISs for all public and private projects when "a federal agency anticipates that an undertaking may significantly impact the environment" or is "environmentally controversial" (Environmental Protection Agency 2007). We found the EIS process to be quite similar for all the projects in our study, although the particular agencies, individuals, and time lines involved differed. As an example, we provide an overview of the process relative to onshore liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects.
As the designated lead agency, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, appointed by the U.S. president, is ultimately responsible for certifying EISs associated with onshore LNG proposals and subsequently approving or rejecting projects. Other agencies, such as the Coast Guard and the Army Corps of Engineers, assist with fact-finding and analysis. Outside consultants are often hired to complete the bulk of the data collection and analysis in the EIS with agency oversight. Nongovernment groups and individuals may also participate at a minimum of two public hearings, where anyone can pose questions about the project and comment on the draft EIS and final EIS.
Outside of this formal process, the company may introduce the project and interact with the community in a variety of ways including contacting the newspaper or holding press conferences, conducting companysponsored informational meetings, meeting privately with elected officials and community leaders, and engaging with organizations that would potentially support or oppose the project. Supporters and opponents of a project are also known to create independent organizations, hold information sessions, gather and submit data on the costs and benefits of the project, contact the media in order to voice their opinions, and organize demonstrations.
We identify movements in this study when communities respond in opposition to a project with a significant amount of collective action, including noninstitutional tactics. 2 Noninstitutionalized forms of action, such as protests and demonstrations, have long been regarded as a hallmark of social movements. Consider the following typical definition of a social movement: "organized efforts, on the part of excluded groups, to promote or resist changes in the structure of society that involve recourse to non-institutional forms of political participation" (McAdam 1982, p. 25) . In this study, communities demonstrated noninstitutional forms of action if opposition took place outside the institutionalized systems of collective claims making and conflict resolution-in our case, action outside the EIS process.
CAPABILITY IN CONTEMPORARY MOVEMENTS
Because theories about capability arose to describe mobilization by the disadvantaged, they may be less effective in explaining contemporary movements. Recent research indicates that community-level collective action is increasingly coordinated by advantaged groups concerned with technological and policy issues (education, environment, land use, housing, transpor-2 Some call this type of bounded action against one project a collective action, arguing that the term "movement" should refer to more widespread actions promoting or opposing a more general problem. Regardless of terminology, we believe that any time a group decides to engage in collective, noninstitutional opposition to a plan or policy (whether scaled at a local or national level), resources, political opportunities, and motivation are still theoretically important. This is especially true when multiple actions are coordinated over time, as opposed to single, spontaneous events such as riots, which are often considered collective actions but may not require organizational resources and strategic planning. tation, and community preservation), not disadvantaged groups with claims about political rights (McAdam et al. 2005 ) . Ingram, Yue, and Rao (2010) found that political opinion and community resources did not accurately predict where protests occurred against proposals for new Wal-Mart stores. This work suggests that when activists are not necessarily disadvantaged and goals are not related to political rights, the role of resources and political opportunity might be less important.
Resources may play a smaller role in opposition to energy infrastructure projects because unlike rights movements that draw participants because they are disadvantaged, these movements draw participation because people live or work near the proposed site. Though we recognize that disadvantaged groups are sometimes geographically concentrated, evidence supporting the contention that the disadvantaged are disproportionately targeted for industrial development is mixed (Cutter 1995) . Companies may consider the potential for community opposition when selecting project sites, but accurately predicting community response is difficult (Ingram et al. 2010 ). More important, energy companies require specific geographical conditions (such as deepwater access or proximity to pipeline and transmission line infrastructure) for a project to succeed. Furthermore, the current regulatory process assesses the possibility that companies target disadvantaged communities. Finally, summary statistics on the communities in our sample show that communities facing proposals are quite diverse (see table 1 ). All of this suggests that proposals are not limited to disadvantaged communities that are less capable of mobilizing.
Just as activists in our cases are different from activists in rights movements, so are their goals. The goals of mobilization against energy infrastructure projects are not necessarily political, and political elites may not be the primary target. Energy infrastructure projects are typically proposed by private entities. Therefore, the target of opposition may be the company itself, landowners, a regulatory agency, consumers of a product, or all of the above. If political officials do play a role in the decision-making process, one would expect political opportunity to be an important facilitator of movement emergence, but this is not always the case. As representatives of specific geographic areas, political officials may become activists, for or against projects, rather than targets of activism.
We do not mean to argue that capability is irrelevant. It is important especially when accounting for the volume of movement activity. However, low levels of resources and political opportunity may be less important to movements opposing energy infrastructure projects because potential activists are not necessarily as disadvantaged as those involved in rights-based movements. Theorizing about threatened advantaged groups, McVeigh (2009, p. 46) While political opportunity and resources remain dominant themes in social movement research, motivation is also necessary for mobilization. Klandermans and Oegma (1987) find that, among potential movement participants, indicators of motivation (attitudes about the movement goal) were among the most important predictors of willingness to participate. However, even as they attempt to explain how people with mobilization potential (i.e., those who initially agree with the movement's grievances) come to participate, they note that the approach "presupposes grievance interpretation . . . [and] neglects to a large extent the creation and interpretation of grievances and the formation of mobilization potentials" (Klandermans and Oegma 1987, p. 529) . Despite what we know about how people come to join movements after they have identified with them, a clear gap in the literature remains regarding why different people and communities come to different conclusions about what issues are worthy of mobilization in the first place.
This issue is addressed in discussions of framing, which focus on activist claims, recruitment, and socialization in a movement that has already emerged (Snow et al. 1986; Benford and Snow 2000) . For example, Robnett (1996) showed that civil rights activists had difficulty mobilizing rural communities because rural residents were less susceptible to the frames that had been successful in urban areas. The central concept in the framing literature is that frames will resonate with potential activists to the extent that they appear credible and salient. As Walder (2009, p. 406 ) aptly points out, this gen- erates an important question about "how variation in individuals' social circumstances or experiences affects their responses to differently framed political appeals." To explain movement emergence, factors that influence judgments of a situation should be present prior to movement appeals.
Some work suggests that structural conditions can influence initial motivation to mobilize. One vein of this research ties motivation directly to the presence of threats related to movement grievances; that is, greater threat is thought to generate greater motivation and subsequently large movements (Amenta and Zylan 1991; Olzak et al. 1994; van Dyke and Soule 2002; Snow, Soule, and Cress 2005) . For example, in a study of movements tackling the issue of homelessness, Snow et al. (2005) measure threat using the homelessness rate and related statistics, such as the poverty rate and the relative cost of housing. Their notion is that, since movement activists are addressing the issue of homelessness, indicators of the severity of the issue will signal the level of motivation.
Other studies emphasizing the relationship between structural change and motivation come to the opposite conclusion. In his original formulation of political process theory, McAdam (1982) noted that intense threat could generate accommodation and despair rather than motivation. He argued that positive structural changes prior to the civil rights movement, not increases in threat, created a renewed sense of justice and hope, ultimately motivating collective action. Subsequent work has shown that this movement was sustained in communities with more black registered voters, more black professionals, and higher median incomes for black households (Andrews 2004) . Similarly, in a study of the Iranian revolution, Kurzman (1996) suggests that levels of threat had no effect on motivation. Instead, Kurzman argues that the belief that the opposition was gaining strength motivated widespread action.
Though there remains a great deal of uncertainty about how the intensity of threat or grievance is related to motivation and subsequent mobilization, the assumption in these arguments is that similar risks or opportunities are evaluated uniformly across communities triggering similar amounts of motivation. This is too simplistic. In the paragraphs below, we argue that community context, prior to movement emergence, provides the basic grounding on which judgments about an issue will be made. These factors create differences between communities in whether they find an issue threatening and how motivated they are to mobilize in the first place. Before we consider whether measures of capability are responsible for the movement emergence or its absence, a clear account of why a community is motivated to act is necessary. Yet, social movement research rarely addresses the role contextual factors play in shaping motivation to mobilize. Social psychology, however, provides evidence that contextual factors can powerfully shape perception, which could, in turn, motivate or deter collective action.
MOTIVATION, CONTEXT, AND UNCERTAINTY
In emphasizing the importance of context, we draw on a consistent finding in social psychology: people think and behave differently in identical situations, and these outcomes can be greatly influenced by local context. 3 For example, Hastorf and Cantril (1954) showed that the judgments about the fairness of referees in the same football game diverged significantly between students at different schools and suggested that these differences were linked to the students' roles as fans partial to one team. Moreover, studies on priming show that randomly selected groups of people can behave very similarly because of the influence of common contextual information. For example, subjects asked to play a game based on the prisoner's dilemma behaved more cooperatively when told it was the Community Game and more competitively when told it was the Wall Street Game (Liberman, Samuels, and Ross 2004) . The name of the game predicted performance more accurately than personality assessments. 4 Furthermore, social psychological findings suggest that context may be even more important under conditions of uncertainty. In a series of studies, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) found that people disproportionately draw on experiences and information that are locally representative or especially vivid to make decisions under uncertainty. Social psychologists have also found that desire for a certain outcome may bias judgment of the nature and likelihood of the outcome, as well as the rules used to assess the situation (Kunda [1990] provides a review of this body of research).
On the basis of this body of work, we suggest that individuals residing in different communities, such as those attending different schools or treated to different primes in the lab, are likely to make different decisions about how to address energy infrastructure project proposals. We do not expect that all individuals in a community will come to the same conclusions. There will be variation. But, like the social psychologists we cite, we argue that the context in which individuals are embedded will shape the average response. Since we are interested in collective action to a community issue, we do not measure individual reactions directly. The average response will influence the relative size of the pool of individuals with mobilization potential and ultimately the subsequent volume action. Given that the risks associated with projects are uncertain, judgments about a project will be even more heavily influenced by context than if impacts were clear. Judgments about, and subsequent responses to, a project will be highly influenced by common local experiences and issues that are understood as relevant or salient to the project proposal.
In the case of opposition to energy infrastructure projects, we believe that local experiences related to land use and infrastructure issues will play a powerful role in determining whether people believe that a proposed project is threatening and are motivated to mobilize against it. These past experiences will be more salient to the degree to which they are similar to the proposed project and occurred in the recent past. We emphasize the presence of similar technologies because individuals are likely to evaluate information about a new proposal in light of experiences with the existing technology. If a similar industry already exists in the community and has generated few, if any, negative consequences, it is unlikely that community members will think that a new project is a threat. On the other hand, if a community has already had negative experiences with a similar proposal or technology, it will draw on this experience and be more wary about new proposals. For energy infrastructure projects, this experience may be rooted in prior opposition to a similar proposal or dissatisfaction with the operation of an existing similar industry. Indeed, Beamish (2001) showed in a case study that the existing relationship between residents and an oil company helped shape their perception of subsequent risks.
Communities that have little positive or negative experience with a similar industry to draw on may be wary of a project because it is new but may also be more open to arguments about costs and benefits. A determining factor in this context may be a community's desire to realize the economic benefits of a large development project. In communities facing economic hardship, residents will likely emphasize the economic benefits and underestimate or deemphasize the potential drawbacks. In this situation, while the community may recognize some threats, motivation to mobilize in opposition may be largely absent. On the other hand, in the absence of economic hardship, community residents may find new development less desirable and may be motivated to avoid even small or unlikely negative consequences, thereby opposing the project. In sum, we argue that key features of community context are better indicators of motivation than more conventional measures of threat.
DATA AND METHODS
Because all large, potentially controversial, infrastructure projects are required to file an EIS, these records provide the population of projects from which we selected cases for study. Cases were drawn from the Cambridge Scientific Abstracts Illumina Digests of Environmental Impact Statements that contains all EISs from the Federal Register. The population of cases was limited to proposals for new energy infrastructure projects for which a final EIS was completed between 2004 and 2007 to ensure that the window for potential collective action would be closed once the study commenced. After randomly drawing a sample, we dropped three cases (15% of the sampling frame) since it was not feasible to conduct subsequent data collection because of difficulty obtaining local newspapers records. 5 The sample was then supplemented with three California projects for which data had already been collected in previous research by the second author. 6 The final sample consists of 20 communities responding to 18 projects in 12 states regarding proposals for LNG terminals (13), 7 nuclear-related projects (two), a hydroelectric project, a wind farm, and a cogeneration project to supply electricity to an existing oil refinery. 8 Initial proposal dates span from early 2001 to 2005. For each community we collected data from the U.S. Census Bureau Demographic Profiles and 2003 American Fact Finder Data Sets), the National Center for Charitable Statistics (2001) , and county clerks' offices to gather community characteristics used to score some of our causal conditions. 9 Summary statistics for these data listed in table 1 demonstrate 5 For the purposes of efficiency, we searched newspapers via online databases and online archives provided by the publication. The publications in these communities had no obtainable electronic records, making comparable levels of search logistically infeasible. 6 Cabrillo Port was in the sampling frame. Mare Island and Long Beach were not because these projects were withdrawn before a final EIS was completed. To address concerns about including these three cases that were not originally part of the sample, we conducted analyses dropping these cases and found the same pattern of results. 7 We use county as the unit of analysis in 18 of 20 communities. While it is always difficult to artificially define community, we used three case-based criteria to do so. First, if any local decision makers were involved in voting on a project, it was generally at the county level. Second, projects tend to be located in unincorporated parts of the county. Third, infrastructure associated with these projects, such as pipelines, transmission lines, and tanker traffic, tends to spread across multiple city jurisdictions. For these reasons it was not uncommon to observe interest from people across a single county. We took care to use city-level analysis in two cases in which the county did not accurately meet these criteria and did not reflect the composition of the mobilizing community (Malibu and Long Beach, California) . To address concerns that comparing cities and counties would violate the unit homogeneity assumption, we conducted separate analysis without the two cities and found a similar pattern of results. 9 See hppt:censtats.census.gov/pub/Profiles.shtml and http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet /DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=ACS&_submenuId=datasets_2&_lang=en. 8 The number of communities does not correspond to the number of projects because some projects provoked reactions from two distinct communities. Ventura County and the City of Malibu, California, both opposed the Cabrillo Port LNG proposal. Gloucester County, New Jersey, and New Castle County, Delaware, both responded to the Crown Landing LNG proposal. There are exactly 17 unique communities among our cases because some communities were the site of multiple proposals. Thus, our 20 communities can be thought of as communities-by-project, similar to the way time-series data are presented in state-years.
that the communities in the sample are quite diverse. The population and population density statistics show that there are rural and urban communities ranging from as few as 10,000 residents to communities with almost 2 million residents. Median household incomes range from well below national averages ($23,000) to well above ($102,000). Unemployment at the time of proposals also varied widely from 3% to 18%. Levels of education varied, with the majority of residents being college graduates in some communities (59%) to very few holding a degree (8%). Measures of civic capacity also varied. Some communities had more than 10 times the number of nonprofits than others, and voter turnout in presidential elections ranged from 42% to 79%.
(Specific data sources for each community can be found in app. Besides utilizing secondary data mentioned above, we also collected data from local newspapers and field interviews. In order to understand important and controversial issues in the community, as well as political and social attitudes prior to the proposal's announcement, we read, coded, and summarized letters to the editor and editorials appearing in local newspapers on every third day during the year prior to the proposal.
Next, our team read every article, editorial, and letter related to the proposed project from the day it became public until a final decision. This allowed us to understand in detail the project review process and community response. In total, members of the research team read 1,620 articles (an average of 81 per community) and 1,098 letters and editorials (an average of 55 per community).
The newspaper also served as our primary source for data on the nature and amount of oppositional collective action in each community. While reading newspapers, researchers systematically cataloged all major events related to the approval process (protests, hearings, report releases, informational meetings, parties, conferences and workshops, votes, and court proceedings), their stance (support, oppose, neutral), sponsor (organization or individual), scope (local, statewide, national), number of attendees, and location. Additionally, we counted letters to the editor and editorials by stance toward the project. (Specific values for each community can be found in app. B.) To identify interviewees, we systematically cataloged names of community members, elected government officials, agency officials, company employees, and other significant actors who appeared in newspaper articles and counted the number of times each was mentioned. The authors and two other researchers arranged and conducted a total of 172 semistructured interviews with these individuals. On average, eight one-hour long interviews were conducted in each community. The purpose of interviews was to better understand how the case unfolded, community member judgments of each project, and the type and level of collective action that occurred.
Methods
Testing theories of movement emergence requires the use of methods that can achieve two ends. First, as McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996, p. 7) wrote, "Understanding the mix of factors that give rise to a movement is the oldest, and arguably the most important, question in the field." Diverse methodological approaches, including experiments (Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina 1982) and comparative case studies (Cress and Snow 2000) , show that it is a combination of factors that results in mobilization, not any single factor. Therefore, the method should provide results that demonstrate the precise mixes, or recipes, of conditions that correspond with mobilization and nonmobilization.
Case studies provide tremendous insight into the combination of factors thought to be essential for the emergence of a specific movement. Unfortunately, generalization from one or a few cases is difficult, and variation in outcome is often not present. In contrast, studies that apply statistical methods to large samples allow one to generalize and typically provide more variation in outcome. Yet, as van Dyke and Soule (2002) point out, these studies often stray from the theoretical importance of combinations by focusing on only one condition at a time or making the conditions compete for explanatory power.
Second, the method chosen must precisely test the theoretical statements at hand. Social movement theory usually indicates a set relationships between causal and outcome conditions. For example, the statement "communities mobilize when they have resources" can be interpreted in two different ways, suggesting different empirical situations. The first interpretation is that resources are necessary for mobilization. In this situation, communities that mobilize are a subset of all communities with resources. The second interpretation is that resources are sufficient for mobilization: communities with resources are a subset of all communities that mobilize. Sufficiency means that resources are enough for mobilization to occur, but there are other ways to arrive at the outcome. Untangling these relationships is critical to providing an accurate causal account of any phenomenon.
To honor the importance of combinations and their precise set relationships, we use fuzzy-set/qualitative comparative analysis (fs/QCA), developed by Charles Ragin (1987 Ragin ( , 2000 Ragin ( , 2008 , to analyze our data. Focusing our data collection on a relatively small sample size of 20 communities has allowed us to retain a rich qualitative understanding of each case. In addition, using the logic of Boolean algebra, we are able to describe precise theoretical relationships and achieve some of the explanatory power associated with large-N studies. Fuzzy-set/QCA examines set-theoretic relationships, generates causal recipes (or combinations of conditions that correspond with the phenomenon), and reduces these recipes to their simplest form.
Unlike older versions of QCA that restrict values of outcome and causal conditions to binary differences in kind (zero when out of the set and one when in the set), fs/QCA allows values to reflect differences in kind and differences in degree. Consider two communities that mobilized. One community might stage several large protests, whereas the other organizes collective appearances by a handful of citizens at EIS review hearings. In QCA, both communities would score a 1 for the mobilization outcome. Fuzzy-set/ QCA distinguishes between these communities by assigning intermediate (fuzzy) values. Zero still indicates that a community is completely out of the set, and 1 still indicates that a community is completely in the set. Values in between can represent cases that are mostly but not fully in the set (.8 ), more in than out of the set (.6 ), ambiguous (.5 ), more out than in the set (.4 ), or mostly but not fully out of the set (.2).
After coding, fs/QCA uses Boolean algebra to analyze the relationships between multiple causal conditions and the outcome. The results provide causal recipes, or combinations of conditions, associated with the phenomenon. Thus, different causal recipes can result in the same outcome. For example, the combinations of (1) threat and political opportunity or (2) threat and resources may both be sufficient to generate collective action. As more causal conditions are added to the analysis, the number of possible recipes multiplies. In the simple binary case, for example, three casual conditions result in eight (2 3 ) possible recipes. Therefore, fs/QCA uses logic and case evidence to reduce recipes to their simplest form.
The fit between the causal recipe and case-based evidence is assessed using two measures: consistency and coverage. Consistency refers to the degree to which cases with the causal combination (X) display the outcome of interest (Y). A perfect score for consistency (1.00) suggests that the causal combination always results in the outcome. Thus, consistency (I) is calculated using the following equation:
where X represents a single condition or a recipe, Y represents the outcome of interest, x i represents the value of a given case in the set X, and y i represents the value of a given case in the set Y. A value of .8 is the conventional benchmark beyond which a condition or recipe is considered consistent. Values above this indicate that the data provide a recipe that is more consistent with the presence of the outcome than its absence.
Besides knowing whether a recipe is more consistent with the presence of an outcome than its absence, we might also wish to know how common the recipe is. For example, a recipe may be consistent with the outcome but describe few cases. Coverage (C) provides an assessment of how much of the outcome is explained by the recipe and is calculated using the following equation:
where X represents a single condition or a recipe, Y represents the outcome of interest, x i represents the value of a given case in the set X, and y i represents the value of a given case in the set Y. Solution coverage indicates how much a group of recipes explains the outcome.
Coding Fuzzy-Set Membership
We use a variety of methods to operationalize our quantitative and qualitative data into fuzzy-set scores.
10 Sometimes we assign a dichotomous value reflecting the presence or absence of a factor. Other times we combine multiple measures through a standardized procedure to capture various dimensions of a concept in a single score. We detail this procedure in our discussion of the outcome condition, mobilization, and utilize it to score political opportunity and civic capacity. Finally, we sometimes generate and apply a coding scheme based on our expert knowledge of the cases to assign scores. When this is done, we conduct sensitivity analyses to ensure that the results are not an artifact of the coding scheme but indeed are related to the concept at hand. Appendix B provides more detailed explanations of how each score was calculated, as well as original values for each data point.
Outcome Condition: Oppositional Mobilization
In deciding whether a community belongs to the set of communities that mobilized in opposition to a project, we used a coding scheme that incorporated three separate features: (a) evidence of collective action, (b) the overall volume of oppositional action in the community, and (c) the use of noninstitutional tactics.
To address the collective nature of mobilization, we counted both noninstitutional action and collective behavior in institutionalized settings (e.g., lawsuits, coordinated appearances at EIS meetings, and communityinitiated information and strategy meetings) as evidence of collective action.
To capture the overall volume of opposition to the project, we used information about noninstitutional activities (the number of protests), other collective activities (the number of coordinated appearances and the number of public meetings), and activities that can express opposition by single individuals (the number of opposing comments at EIS hearings, opposing letters to the editor, and whether a lawsuit was filed). We combined all of these measures into a single score using the following procedure. First, each of these measures received a fuzzy-set code based on its percentile rank relative to other communities. For example, Malibu had five protests that fell in the 80th percentile relative to the other 19 communities and so was assigned a .8. With the same method, Malibu received a 1 for the number of coordinated appearances, a .8 for the number of public meetings, a .8 for the number of people commenting at EIS hearings, a .8 for the number of letters, and a 0 because no lawsuit was filed. Next, these six normalized values were summed together, giving Malibu a total of 4.2 (.8 1 1 1 .8 1 .8 1 .8 1 0). The summed scores for all 20 communities ranged from 0 to 4.4. With a 4.2, Malibu fell in the 80th percentile and was assigned an overall score of .8, placing it mostly but not fully in the set of communities with a high volume of oppositional activity.
Finally, to be in the set of communities that mobilized (score above .5, the point of maximum ambiguity), the community had to show evidence of collective and noninstitutional behavior and a score above .5 on volume of activity. If both collective and noninstitutional actions were evident, the community's final score on mobilization was identical to its volume score, if its volume score was 1 or .8. Otherwise, its final mobilization score was a .6. Communities with evidence of collective behavior or noninstitutional behavior (but not both) fell out of the set and received a score equivalent to their volume score. Communities with no evidence of collective behavior or noninstitutional action scored a 0. Table 2 provides the name of each community, the type of project proposed, and final fuzzy-set scores for the outcome condition-mobilization-as well as all other causal conditions, the coding of which we describe next.
Threat
Risks associated with large energy infrastructure projects include threats to public safety, health, the environment, and property and are known to elicit a NIMBY (Not in My Back Yard) response (Dear 1992; Hunter and Leyden 1995; Lober 1995; Vajjhala and Fischbeck 2007; Gallagher, Ferreira, and Convery 2008) . These threats are conceptually similar to those identified in previous social movement studies and the literature on facility siting, where aspects of a facility such as type, size, proximity to residences, and the likelihood of causing health and environmental damages are referred to as "risks" (Boholm 2004; Freudenburg 2004; Schively 2007) . This set of threats can be captured using information on project type and proximity.
11 Project type provides information about the technology used and its particular environmental, health, and safety risks. For example, we might expect a power plant to pose different risks than a wind farm. The proximity of any large industrial project to areas not zoned for industrial development, especially residential areas, is critically important to arguments about health, safety, and property threats. For example, a large explosion would affect a community more if it were close enough to burn homes and kill bystanders. Similarly, unsightly views, noise, pollution, and traffic caused by a project pose more threat to people and property values if they are close to areas where these problems do not currently exist.
All projects in our study are potentially threatening. If they were not, they would not have been subject to the EIS process. Scoring projects on the basis of type and proximity is an attempt to capture the remaining variation in risk. To score this condition, we began by assigning fuzzy scores to communities by project type according to findings by Slovic (1987) . The two nuclear-related projects scored a 1 (fully in the set of threatening project types) because they are the most risky. Open-loop LNG projects scored . 8 . They have all the risks associated with LNG, but the technology uses seawater to regasify LNG and therefore poses an added risk to fisheries. Closed-loop LNG facilities and the cogeneration project received a .6. These projects are similar with regard to risks associated with transporting, converting, and storing natural gas products. The hydroelectric project scored a .4 because of well-documented effects on ecosystems, and the wind project scored a .2 since these projects are considered relatively benign and typically generate controversy related to obstruction of views rather than safety, health, and environmental threats.
Next, we scored projects on the basis of proximity to residential communities. The two projects zero miles away received a score of 1, nine projects one or two miles away scored a .8, two projects six miles away received a .6, six projects 11-15 miles away scored a .4, and the project 38 miles away scored a .2. After scoring type and proximity, we added the scores and assigned new fuzzy final scores by giving the highest a score of 1, the next highest .8, and so on.
The final scores depict project threat as a combination of type and proximity to the community. Two projects scored a 1 and were fully in the set of threatening projects: the proposal to build another nuclear reactor in Claiborne County, Mississippi, and an LNG project that was particularly close to nonindustrial areas. Eleven projects received a score of .8 (mostly but not fully in the set of threatening projects) and included the nuclear storage facility, several onshore LNG projects just one or two miles from residential areas, and the cogeneration project. An open-loop LNG project 11 miles from shore scored a .6, putting it more in than out of the set of threatening projects. The remaining offshore LNG projects as well as the open-loop LNG project 38 miles from shore received a .4, putting them more out than in the set of threatening projects. Finally, the wind project received a score of .2, putting it mostly but not fully out of the set of threatening projects, reflecting the fact that the technology is not particularly threatening and the site was six miles from town.
Political Opportunity
In recent years, political opportunity has been criticized for subsuming many conceptually different ideas, mechanisms, and measurements (Gamson and Meyer 1996; Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Meyer and Minkoff 2004) . Here we limit our definition of the concept to how open the institutionalized political system is to claims by movement actors.
To score political opportunity, we used three indicators: electoral vulnerability of decision makers, temporal proximity to an upcoming election, and jurisdiction. First, following Skocpol (1985) , we noted that bureaucrats are able to act independently of public pressure. In contrast, elected officials are much more susceptible to public opinion. Therefore, decision-making bodies that comprise elected officials will present opponents with more political leverage than those that are highly bureaucratic. Thus, we first measured the proportion of decision makers who were elected officials. Next, because elected officials are held accountable through the election process, an election presents another window of political opportunity. Thus, communities where elected decision makers were up for reelection during the review process were scored in the set (scoring 1) and out otherwise (scoring 0). Finally, studies show that local actors have less influence over decisions under national jurisdiction (Andrews 2004; Boudet and Ortolano 2010) . Thus, we contend that greater political opportunity results when local officials (as opposed to state or national officials) are responsible for the decision about a project. We scored the jurisdiction of decision makers using the following coding scheme: a case received a 1 if the elected officials were local, .6 if there was at least one local elected official, and 0 if there were no local elected officials on the decision-making body. These three aspects were then combined into a single score of membership in the set of communities with opportune political structures.
Civic Capacity
Three proxies were also combined to assign communities to the set of high levels of civic capacity. Civic capacity corresponds to the concept of resources from our theoretical discussion but is more accurate because we stress organizational resources rather than economic resources. The number of nonprofits per capita is used as a proxy for organizational capacity, following Molotch, Freudenburg, and Paulsen (2000) , Sherman (2004) , and Boudet (2010). We used voter turnout figures as a proxy for community involvement in the democratic decision-making process, similarly to Hamilton (1993) . Finally, the percentage of community members with a college education was used as a proxy for community members' general knowledge and sense of efficacy. Studies show that education levels are not only a major predictor of volunteerism and community involvement (Musick and Wilson 2008) but also the only consistent determining factor of oppositional attitudes to locally unwanted land uses (Freudenburg and Gramling 1994) .
Similar Industry
We used the presence of a similar industry in the community as a proxy for a community's familiarity with a technology similar to the one proposed. This condition was scored on the basis of the research on each individual case. Communities with extensive similar industry scored a 1. All other communities received a 0. The presence of similar industry may denote the type of "developmental channelization" described in Gramling and Freudenburg (1996, p. 483) . They argue that "as the various components of the human environment become adapted to a given form of development activity, there is a tendency for new skills, knowledge, tools, networks, and other resources to be built up around that activity. . . . [This process] narrows a region's options, because time, resources, human capital, are devoted to a particular developmental scenario, sometimes limiting the options for alternative scenarios" (Gramling and Freudenburg 2006, p. 456) . In essence, the existing industry becomes a highly salient feature of the community especially with reference to decisions about development.
Previous Oppositional Experience
Previous experience opposing such a project or a similar issue may sensitize a community to a newly proposed project. Our coding scheme accounts for the existence of such an experience and how similar the experience was to the proposal under consideration. Time and similarity are important because community members will be more likely to draw parallels between experiences that were more recent and similar than those that occurred far in the past or share only minor or abstract characteristics. We learned of prior events through our newspaper searches and field interviews. Because our respondents were often activist leaders in the communities, politicians, and industry experts, we are confident that by triangulating their responses with newspaper accounts, we were able to get a comprehensive picture of previous oppositional experiences in the community. In some cases their responses confirmed our theory that community members would understand present struggles through the lens of past experience. It was not uncommon for them to mention and compare the issue under study to other issues without prompting. When interviewees did not bring up past experiences independently, the interview schedule included questions about major community issues prior to the proposal as well as how similar this response was to typical responses. Using this information, we assigned communities a score of 1 if they opposed the exact same type of project. They scored a .8 if they had a previous oppositional experience with a similar project any time in the past. They scored a .6 if they experienced a major dispute regarding land use (but not specifically energy) in recent years. Otherwise, the community scored a 0. (Detailed descriptions of the previous oppositional experiences can be found in app. B.)
Economic Hardship
We suggest that the potential economic benefits of a project may cause a community to downplay potential threats and limit motivation to mobilize in opposition. Because the benefits of a project to a local community are typically economic, this interest should stem from a state of economic hardship such that the community would actively support investment. Each community was scored relative to the others on the basis of its unemployment rate, reflecting a need for jobs, and its relatively low median income, reflecting a need for general investment. The final score combined these two dimensions.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We have argued that, without looking at counterfactual cases (in which communities do not mobilize), it is impossible to know if high levels of political opportunity, civic capacity, and threat are necessary for mobilization or low levels are sufficient for nonmobilization as classic arguments suggest. In table 3, we assess the necessity and sufficiency of these conditions in our sample of cases. In all tables below, uppercase letters indicate high levels of a condition and lowercase letters indicate low levels or the absence of a con-dition. In table 3, our theoretical expectations about the correspondence between the levels of the condition and the mobilization outcome are listed in parentheses.
We find no evidence that high levels of threat, civic capacity, or political opportunity are necessary for mobilization. The table shows that half of the communities facing high levels of threat mobilize and half do not. Low levels of threat are sufficient to explain no mobilization. But three communities that face low-threat projects mobilize anyway. If a project is not very threatening, what motivates action? The same pattern holds true for civic capacity. A high level of civic capacity is not necessary for mobilization, but a low level is sufficient to explain nonmobilization. Still, five communities with low levels of civic capacity mobilized anyway. Finally, we find that low levels of political opportunity are not sufficient for nonmobilization, supporting our argument that political opportunity may be less important in explaining these types of movements. These results suggest the importance of examining combinations of causal conditions, or recipes, for mobilization, as opposed to single conditions. Table 4 presents each of the possible combinations of threat, civic capacity, and political opportunity and lists the communities in each causal recipe on the basis of mobilization outcome. A classic understanding of threat, political opportunity, and civic capacity (TPC) suggests that all three must be present at relatively high levels for a movement to emerge. Three communities in our sample correspond with this combination: Solano, Mobile, and Whatcom Counties. However, Solano and Mobile mobilize while Whatcom does not. Had we studied only communities that mobilized, we would never have observed the fact that a community with all the "right" ingredients (Whatcom) did not mobilize. In fact, table 4 shows that a total of five of the eight possible combinations of these conditions correspond with both mobilization and no mobilization. This suggests that, when counterfactual cases are included in the sample, the classic components of social movement theory are inadequate to distinguish between mobilizing and nonmobilizing cases.
Throughout the article, we have advocated for explanations of emergence that include both motivation and capability. We have argued that the main problem with the classic model above is that objective measures of threat are not good proxies for motivation. Capability matters, but only in combination with motivation, and there is some evidence that it may matter less for movements not specifically related to social and political disadvan- tage. To illustrate these points, we describe four community responses in detail, comparing cases with similar levels of threat but different mobilization outcomes. Ventura County, California, and Cameron Parish, Louisiana, face LNG projects that pose relatively low levels of threat. As expected, Cameron Parish does not mobilize but, surprisingly, Ventura does. The other two cases we focus on, Claiborne County, Mississippi, and Whatcom County, Washington, both face projects with relatively high levels of threat. Yet we observe mobilization in the community with low levels of capability and little mobilization in the community with high levels of capability. We show how community context explains these unexpected results.
Low Threat, Different Actions
The first pair of cases faced similar and relatively unthreatening proposals for LNG terminals. The Cabrillo Port LNG terminal in Ventura County, California, was mostly but not fully out of the set of threatening projects (scoring .4) because it was located 14 miles offshore. The Sabine Pass LNG terminal in Cameron Parish, Louisiana, also scored a .4 on our conventional measure of threat because it was rather remote, located 12 miles from residential areas. Thus, if we evaluated the motivation to mobilize on the threat posed by the facility alone, both cases would seem unlikely locations for a movement. Yet community reactions were extremely different. Cameron Parish did not mobilize, but mobilization in Ventura County was extensive, involving a total of 338 letters to the editor, 138 speakers at a single EIS hearing, five coordinated actions at events organized by others, three public meetings organized by opponents, and eight protest events.
A conventional account of the different mobilization outcomes in Ventura County and Cameron Parish would suggest that because the threat of the project was the same, the reason Ventura mobilized and Cabrillo Port did not was that Ventura County had a high level of capability (political opportunity and civic capacity) whereas Cameron Parish did not. In fact, Cameron Parish was never motivated to mobilize in the first place. Instead of being neutral about the project, residents of Cameron Parish supported it. Shortly after Cheniere LNG filed its application, a police juror (the equivalent of a county commissioner) was quoted in the local newspaper as saying to Cheniere representatives at a public meeting, "All of Cameron Parish is behind your project. When you called, I thought we had got a call from heaven" (Wise 2003) . In contrast, opposition of the Cabrillo Port project was widespread and vehement. John Flynn, a Ventura County supervisor, noted, "The public safety issue was important. People were scared and nervous about this big facility and the presence of the gas" (interview with the second author, May 2, 2007). The mayor of nearby Malibu, Andy Stern, expressed the concerns vividly: "If you read the EIR, basically we're guar-anteed a significant amount of air pollution in the best case. In the worst case, there is an enormous potential for catastrophe, and there is nothing you can do to mitigate this potential except not to build it here. . . . If that thing blows, it would cause devastation to the wildlife. They say that the good news is that any explosion won't hit land, but what if you're out there fishing with your kid?" (interview with the second author, March 19, 2007). Why were Ventura County residents so motivated to oppose an LNG project that Cameron Parish residents welcomed? In the next few paragraphs we will show how community context accounts for this difference.
The presence of a similar industry in Cameron Parish was particularly important in shaping the view of the project. Louisiana has a long history of accepting and encouraging energy-related development on and near its shores (Gramling and Freudenburg 1996) . At the time of the Sabine Pass proposal, Cameron Parish residents knew about LNG terminals. Nearby Lake Charles, Louisiana, had served as home to one of only four existing LNG facilities in the United States since 1981. As a result, residents had grown accustomed to its operations and did not fear LNG. Kristi Darby, of Louisiana State University, commented in a Mobile (Ala.) Press-Register article that "people in Louisiana are used to having the petroleum industry around. The oil industry has been in Louisiana for decades. The communities are not afraid [of LNG]" ( James 2005) .
The community considered LNG not only a "natural" extension of the oil and gas industry but also a way to brighten Louisiana's and the parish's dwindling economic prospects. At the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission hearing about the draft EIS for the Sabine Pass project, Bobby Conner, the local tax assessor, asserted that Cheniere Energy . . . would be a great help to our tax base, which is dwindling . . . because . . . everybody's going deeper and deeper offshore to drill for oil and gas these days. And the LNG facility, it would be real welcome. . . . Since 1999, Louisiana has lost 4,000 jobs in the petrochemical industry and is on track to lose another 18,000 in 2004-2005. Nowhere have they been stinged [sic] more sharply than the ammonia fertilizer industry where natural gas makes up 90 percent of the process. Four years ago there were nine aluminum plants in Louisiana. Today we have three. This has made the LNG project a top priority in our state and in our nation. (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 2004, p. 22) In fact, the Southwest Louisiana Partnership for Economic Development, then a newly created public entity whose board included elected representatives from each of the five parishes it served (including Cameron), was actively seeking industrial development prior to the Sabine Pass proposal.
In contrast, the motivation to oppose Cabrillo Port in California stemmed from the lack of a similar industry combined with prior experience. The location of the Cabrillo Port facility offshore of Oxnard and only one hour south of Santa Barbara placed it in a well-known hotbed of coastal and enCommunity Response to Environmental Risk vironmental activism. In fact, many scholars believe that the 1969 oil spill in Santa Barbara and the associated community reaction marked the birth of the modern U.S. environmental movement (Easton 1970; Molotch 1970; Molotch et al. 2000) . The idea that the local environment could be adversely and negatively affected by this industry had been a salient issue for decades.
When the Cabrillo Port project was proposed, residents of Ventura County also already had a great deal of experience opposing LNG facilities: first in 1974 when the Western LNG Terminal Company requested approval of an onshore LNG import site at Oxnard and again in 2002 when Oxy Energy Services sought to purchase part of the Ormond Beach Wetlands to construct an onshore LNG facility. Many of the same groups that originally opposed the 1974 proposal-both former and current members of the Oxnard City Council, the Sierra Club, and the Environmental Defense Center-were involved in a successful effort to stop Oxy by convincing the Coastal Conservancy to purchase the property. Thus, prior to the Cabrillo Port proposal, Ventura County was home to a significant network of people who thought that LNG was a threat.
Once motivated, activists in Ventura County exploited the political opportunity offered by decision-making structures that were more open to local concerns and high levels of civic capacity to generate widespread opposition. Broken Hill Proprietary's (BHP's) Cabrillo Port proposal first went public when the company submitted applications to the Federal Maritime Administration for a deepwater port license. This act triggered a federal EIS, led by the U.S. Coast Guard, and a state environmental impact report (EIR), led by the State Lands Commission. Despite a low-key public announcement, limited to the newspapers, many politically active Ventura County residents became aware of the facility because they were monitoring energy industry activities on the West Coast as a result of their previous fights against LNG. These individuals and organizations quickly mobilized against the facility, contacting local elected officials, picketing outside BHP's headquarters in Oxnard, and testifying at public meetings. Prior experience not only shaped the reaction but had a powerful effect on the community's ability to learn about and quickly mobilize against the proposal.
With the release of the draft EIS/EIR and the resulting article in the Los Angeles Times, a powerful group-the Sierra Club Great Coastal Places Campaign-became aware of the project and allied itself with the initial Oxnard opponents. With this influx of resources, including the help of a paid community organizer from the campaign, Oxnard activists began holding regular meetings to plan opposition events. They held their first large-scale protest-Hands along the Pipeline-in May 2005. This event marked the end of the initial opposition group's small weekly protests outside BHP's offices in Oxnard and the beginning of a larger mobilization effort in Oxnard. With the Sierra Club heavily involved in creating an opposition strategy, opponents started to implement a variety of tactics: "tabling" at the farmers market and festivals, canvassing neighborhoods with flyers and fact sheets, and organizing a larger letter-writing campaign and petition.
About the same time, Susan Jordan, a well-known coastal advocate and director of Santa Barbara's California Coastal Protection Network, joined the opposition. Her previous efforts focused on enacting state legislation requiring a ranking of all LNG proposals prior to approval. However, when Cabrillo Port emerged as the front-runner in the race to site a facility, she became involved in opposing the proposal itself. Her extensive prior experience was critical to the mobilization effort.
Jordan utilized her connections to garner monetary and technical resources for the movement. Ozzie Silna, a wealthy philanthropist who worked with Jordan on Malibu's Local Coastal Plan, funded a review of the draft EIS/EIR by the Environmental Defense Center (EDC), a nonprofit law firm in Southern California that Jordan had worked with previously. The EDC provided the opposition with the technical and legal know-how to review large, complicated regulatory documents, and Jordan provided the political skills and connections to effectively lobby state officials and the governor. A strong coalition against Cabrillo Port, involving the leadership of the California Coastal Protection Network, the EDC, the Sierra Club, and Oxnard environmental and social justice groups, began to take shape.
The involvement of state officials in the approval process created a key political opportunity for opponents. The facility's offshore location meant that then California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger would have veto authority over the proposal. In contrast, political opportunity and civic capacity were low in Cameron Parish, but we find no evidence that this accounted for the lack of opposition. The community was not ignorant of the issues or incapable of acting. In fact, the community did rally-in support of the project. The EIS process necessitated two public hearings in the parish. Both were well attended, drawing 100-200 residents from a total population of fewer than 10,000. Although our measures of civic capacity indicated relatively low levels of many types of civic capacity, there was no lack of interest in the issue. Furthermore, this interest and participation arose in the face of very low levels of political opportunity. No elected officials were involved in decision making.
James Ducote, a former employee of Cameron Parish then working for the state's Economic Development Department (and who now works for Cheniere Energy), was particularly instrumental in convincing Cheniere's founder and chief executive officer, Charif Souki, to locate in Cameron Parish. In fact, according to one interviewee, the original deal for the facility was struck in the back of a pickup truck. Ducote took Souki to visit what would eventually become the site of the Sabine Pass facility with the landowner, Butch Crain. The three shook hands on the deal during the visit. This handshake deal between company, state, and private landowner before any public consultation occurred contrasts sharply with what we might think of as a politically opportune process of decision making. Nevertheless, all comments were supportive of the facility, except for one lone naysayer, Jerry Norris, a local fishing guide from Texas. Norris was concerned about the placement of spoils from dredging associated with the construction of the facility but was eventually persuaded to support the facility. The facility was approved less than one year after Cheniere submitted its application.
Although the Sabine Pass proposal is explained by a combination of more conventional factors from the study of social movements, had civic capacity and political opportunity been present, there is little evidence to suggest that residents would have opposed the proposal. In fact, it may have generated even more support for the facility-support that stems from the parish's community context.
Both cases exemplify how community context factors, which have little to do with the more traditional measure of threat, shape motivation. When motivation is present, Ventura County shows that classical social movement conditions (notably civic capacity and political opportunity) allowed the movement to grow in intensity and ultimately prevail. In Cameron Parish, the presence of a similar industry motivated support for the project, but there is little evidence that the low levels of political opportunity and civic capacity presented major barriers.
High Levels of Threat, Different Actions
One might suspect that community context matters only when projects pose relatively low levels of threat. Communities might be more flexible in their response, given that the risks of nonaction are relatively low. In the next paragraphs we show that community context matters for the reception of relatively threatening projects as well. Claiborne County, Mississippi, faced a proposal to expand the existing Grand Gulf nuclear plant, and Whatcom County, Washington, faced expansion of the British Petroleum (BP) Cherry Point oil refinery. Owing to the nature of the technologies and their proximity to residential areas, both were relatively threatening proposals (scoring 1 and .8, respectively). Although Whatcom County had high levels of political opportunity and civic capacity, it did almost nothing to oppose the plant, whereas Claiborne mobilized despite relatively low levels of capability. In these communities, community context (the presence of a similar industry, prior experiences, and economic need) shaped motivation and, ultimately, different reactions.
In June 2002, BP first proposed a cogeneration facility to provide steam and electricity to meet the operating needs of its adjacent refinery and electrical power for local and regional consumption. The proposed facility was to be located on BP-owned property, zoned for heavy impact industrial development adjacent to the existing BP site in northwestern Whatcom County, Washington. The refinery had operated for over 30 years, processing 225,000 barrels of crude oil a day: enough to provide about 20% of the gasoline market share of Washington and Oregon and the majority of jet fuel to international airports in Seattle, Portland, and Vancouver, B.C., and to serve as the largest West Coast supplier of jet fuel to the U.S. military. In addition, the refinery employed about 825 full-time workers. Thus, the refinery served an important role both locally, providing jobs and tax revenue, and regionally, providing necessary transportation fuel.
Moreover, BP had developed a reputation as a good corporate neighbor with extensive charitable contributions and a safe operations record. BP argued that the new boilers and technology associated with the proposed cogeneration facility would actually reduce air pollution from the existing refinery and water withdrawals from the Nooksack River. Nevertheless, the facility is located close to coastal homes in Birch Bay, and locals were concerned about air quality and noise as well as the destruction of open space surrounding the facility.
Several contextual issues limited local community interest in this proposal. Soaring energy prices and rolling brownouts and blackouts (associated with electricity deregulation in California and the Enron scandal) were major issues for Whatcom County in 2001 and had caused the closure of several local industrial plants. Energy supply was such a problem that one legislator suggested building a new government owned and operated power plant in Cherry Point. Debate about the project also came on the heels of the September 11 attacks. BP's Michael Abendoff noted during our interview that the tone surrounding discussions of energy supply focused on energy security and independence during this time.
On the other hand, the community was well aware of the risks associated with energy facility development and was well equipped to mobilize against such proposals. The county seat, Bellingham, had been the site of a devastating pipeline explosion in 1999 that had killed three children. This incident had a major impact on the community and resulted in the creation of the Pipeline Safety Trust, a national leader in promoting fuel transportation safety through education and advocacy. Moreover, a similar proposal in 1999 for a natural gas-fired generation facility, Sumas Energy 2 (SE2), generated a significant amount of opposition in both Canada and Washington State, with hundreds attending hearings and writing comment letters. Thus, the community surrounding the facility was well versed in techniques for opposing such facilities and knew how to make its voice heard. Furthermore, political opportunity was present. The same county councilman who served on the board of the state's Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council and played an instrumental role in initially denying SE2 in 2001 evaluated the BP project.
However, for a number of reasons, the community chose not to oppose the BP Cherry Point cogeneration proposal. One environmental leader noted that the project was not a priority for her organization because it was located in an area that was already industrial and represented a "reasonable alternative" to current uses. Another environmentalist, whose home was just steps from BP property, revealed that the small amount of opposition that did develop against the project was more about maximizing mitigation than disagreements about the facility itself. State Representative Doug Erickson summed up local attitudes toward the project when he explained why he commented in favor of the proposal at an EIS hearing: "BP is one of our best employers . . . a huge tax generator, a great facility. . . . They have been and continue to be excellent corporate citizens and neighbors here in Whatcom County so how can you not support them when they're doing so many good things for the community?" As a result, the facility was approved just two years after it was proposed. The Whatcom County case provides an example of an objectively threatening proposal, located in a community that had the capacity, opportunity, and experience to mobilize in opposition but chose not to because of existing contextual conditions that limited motivation. Specifically, the proposal came from a company that had safely operated an existing facility and had been a major employer in the community for over 30 years.
The nuclear facility in Claiborne County had also been operating safely in the community for years. Even though nuclear projects would normally be considered threatening (Slovic 1987) , most local residents were supportive of construction of an additional reactor because of the tax revenue the project would generate. Economic issues were a major concern in Claiborne County. Several people commented during interviews and at meetings on the EIS that they would hate to see what Claiborne County would look like without the tax revenue provided by the original Grand Gulf reactor. The editor of the local paper wrote, "I tremble to think what sort of tax base Claiborne County would have today if Grand Gulf had not been built" (Crisler 2009 ).
Local opposition, therefore, was motivated by demands for a fairer distribution of economic benefits-demands rooted in past experience. Property tax revenue from the first Grand Gulf nuclear power plant (at the time, $16 million) initially went to Claiborne County. This revenue represented an enormous sum for the county, which had previously operated on a budget of less than $1 million. However, in 1986, just one year after the first Grand Gulf plant began commercial operations, the Mississippi State Legislature passed a bill that divided this revenue among all the counties receiving power from the plant. Claiborne County sued the Tax Commission in response to the amendment but lost in a ruling by the Mississippi Supreme Court (Burrell v. Mississippi State Tax Commission, 536 So. 2d 848 [1988] ). This change to the tax code represented a consistent sore spot for the community. Claiborne County has a long history of civil rights activism; therefore, it is not surprising that questions about the tax code became intertwined with concerns about environmental justice. At the meeting on the draft EIS for the second reactor, Evan Doss argued that the distribution of tax payments from the first facility "is racist and, in fact, discriminates against the predominantly black Claiborne County. . . . Given the severity of the State of Mississippi's misconduct, it would be unreasonable in the extreme for the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission to overlook the obvious and neglect to take appropriate measures to prevent further actual discrimination against the predominantly black Claiborne County in connection with the second Grand Gulf nuclear power plant" (Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2005, p. 68). This argument for construction, but only if benefits were distributed without discrimination, contrasts sharply with external activists who opposed construction of the reactor altogether.
While motivations differed, external activists were responsible for the volume of opposition in the case. There is a long tradition of activism against nuclear proposals in the United States-preceding the Three Mile Island disaster in 1979-that has created a number of national organizations that strive to become involved in every nuclear proposal around the country. In fact, in both communities in our sample where nuclear facilities were proposed (Claiborne and Aiken), national antinuclear groups became involved almost immediately. These national groups monitor the Federal Register for proposals and were on high alert prior to the Grand Gulf proposal because Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham had announced the Nuclear Power 2010 Program, a program designed to reinvigorate nuclear power generation, in February 2002.
Thus, external national organizations, including the Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS) Reactor Watchdog Group, Public Citizen, and the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, helped to launch the opposition campaign in Claiborne County. NIRS and Public Citizen conducted site visits, organized two public meetings with the local chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), collected affidavits from local first responders about the inadequacy of current emergency plans in the county, wrote about the proposal in press releases and newsletters, testified at the scoping and draft EIS public meetings, met privately with state legislators, and organized rallies around EIS meetings. At the rally on the steps of the Capitol in Jackson before the meeting on the draft EIS, opponents brought an ice sculpture of a nuclear reactor to symbolize the probable meltdown of the proposed facility.
Opponents also worked to gain standing (which required participation from local residents) in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's adjudicatory proceedings and secured legal representation from Diane Curran, who had worked with the same external groups to stop a uranium enrichment plant in Homer, Louisiana, one of the first successful environmental justice claims brought to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
A more conventional account of the Claiborne County case might conclude that although most people find nuclear plants threatening, Claiborne would have difficulty mobilizing given low levels of political opportunity and civic capacity and note that luckily the presence of external activists provided the resources needed to join forces against the project. We have shown that frames used by external activists were not taken up by locals who were motivated by salient issues of economic well-being and social justice in their community, not by fear for their safety. Furthermore, while it is true that much of the mobilization we observed was instigated and supported by external activists, Claiborne County's low score on civic capacity does not adequately explain the muted local response. It was not an issue of capability but an issue of motivation. One local resident commented, "If the community had issues with this proposal, you would have heard about it."
This belief stems from a long history of civil rights activism, activism that occurred in an era when such actions held significantly more potential for personal harm than mobilization against Grand Gulf. Indeed, the local chapter of the NAACP helped African-Americans in Port Gibson (the community in the county nearest to the Grand Gulf facility) stage a boycott of white merchants from 1966 to 1972 to gain equal rights across Claiborne County (Crosby 2005) . About the same time as the second Grand Gulf proposal, residents were engaged in another land use dispute. The Mississippi Department of Transportation (MDOT) was trying to determine whether mandated expansion of Highway 61 to four lanes should continue through Port Gibson. The highway becomes a local street in Port Gibson bordered by several beautiful historic churches and homes that the community hoped to preserve. According to interviewees, community involvement in the debate over the MDOT project was extensive compared with that over the nuclear proposal. All this suggests that, had community members perceived the project as a threat, they would have reacted more forcefully. The low levels of political opportunity and civic capacity may not have presented sufficient barriers to mobilization, but motivations different from those expressed by external activists did.
These case studies show that community context shapes judgments about infrastructure projects and motivates different community responses. The presence of a similar industry tends to generate comfort and familiarity, even with nuclear projects, which would normally be considered threatening (Slovic 1987) . Prior experience also provides points of comparison against which proposals are evaluated. Negative prior experiences furnish a set of people with ready-made views on the issue and networks to mobilize quickly. Concern about the local economy generally causes residents to value the economic benefits of a project. All of the cases demonstrate that motivation is critical. Further, while political opportunity and civic capacity (sometimes provided by external advocates) were critical in accounting for the volume of oppositional activity in mobilizing cases, the cases of Cameron Parish and Claiborne County put into question whether low levels of political opportunity and civic capacity present sufficient barriers to mobilization. Instead of providing details of all 20 cases, the next section of the article utilizes fs/QCA to find general patterns across mobilizing and nonmobilizing communities. Table 5 presents the reduced recipes corresponding with nonmobilization. We have argued that contextual conditions, including having a similar industry in the community (SIMILAR), high levels of economic hardship (HARDSHIP), and little to no prior experience (exp), are major factors inhibiting the motivation to mobilize and therefore should correspond with nonmobilization. Indeed, we find that recipes with only these conditions do a good job of explaining nonmobilization. From the table, we see that the overall solution reaches conventional levels of consistency (.89 ) and that coverage is .70. In fact, these recipes explain nine of 10 nonmobilizing cases and only two cases that mobilized. In both of these cases, Aiken County and Cameron Parish Gulf Landing, the majority of the opposition initially came from external advocates.
Recipes of Nonmobilization and Mobilization
If motivation to act is necessary for mobilization, as we have argued, we might expect that community context conditions alone would do well at explaining nonmobilization. Indeed recipes using community context conditions alone outperformed recipes combining the "conventional" measure of threat (threat) with measures of capability, political opportunity (political), and civic capacity (capacity). Although the conventional recipes make theoretical sense (low levels correspond with nonmobilization), the solution barely meets the standard for consistency (.80 ), explains fewer cases of nonmobilization (seven compared with nine), and incorrectly corresponds with four (as opposed to two) cases of mobilization. This suggests that community context conditions indicating a lack of motivation are sufficient to explain nonmobilization in many cases.
Finally, in line with our arguments, the model that replaces the objective measure of threat with community context conditions to indicate motivation and includes measures of capability presents the best results. The solution has the highest consistency (.98 ), has good coverage (.73) , and explains "and" while addition signs represent "or." Communities in parentheses are contradictory; i.e., the conditions were present but they fail to obtain the outcome. "and" while addition signs represent "or." Communities in parentheses are contradictory; i.e., the conditions were present but they fail to obtain the outcome.
nine of the 10 nonmobilizing cases and only one mobilizing case. The first recipe highlights the fact that, even with prior experience (EXP), the presence of a similar industry (SIMILAR) can dampen motivation, as in the case of Whatcom County. The second and third recipes suggest that the high levels of economic hardship (HARDSHIP) or the presence of a similar industry (SIMILAR)-combined with the absence of experience (exp), low levels of civic capacity (capacity), and low levels of political opportunity (political)-coincides with low levels of mobilization, as in the case of Cameron Parish Sabine Pass. Table 6 summarizes the recipes corresponding with mobilization. Here the first recipe is derived by using conventional measures of threat (THREAT) along with the measures of capability: political opportunity (POLITICAL) and civic capacity (CAPACITY). 12 The result is just short of reaching conventional levels of consistency at .79 and supports theories about capability, showing that high levels of political opportunity and civic capacity correspond with mobilization. However, the fact that the objective threat condition does not figure into the result is troubling. Furthermore, the coverage is relatively low (.48 ), explaining only four cases of mobilization and two cases of nonmobilization. We described one of the cases that fit this recipe, Ventura County, above. The absence of threat in the recipe supports our suggestion that understanding motivation should not be based on information about the threat posed by the facility itself but community context in which it is proposed.
Indeed, recipes derived from community context and capability factors explain mobilization with better consistency (.87 compared to .79 ) and coverage (.65 compared to .48 ). These context-and capability-based recipes explain six cases of mobilization and only one of nonmobilization. Using these factors, we see that opposition in Ventura was motivated by suspicion of an unfamiliar industry (similar) and a history of oppositional experiences (EXP)-factors that align more clearly with our narrative of the case. Once the community was motivated to act, it was able to exploit reserves of civic capacity (CAPAC-ITY) and political opportunity (POLITICAL) to launch large-scale (and successful) opposition.
13
12 We do not do an analysis of community context conditions alone for mobilization because we do not expect that indicators of motivation alone would be adequate to explain mobilization. Rather, we present results for models that include indicators of motivation and capability. 13 Our discussion seems to indicate that Whatcom County is a particularly influential case. To check the robustness of our findings, we conducted all analyses excluding Whatcom County and found that it did not change the results in theoretically important ways. While excluding Whatcom County increased consistency for recipes of objective threat and capability, the content of the recipes remained the same and thus still could not account for why some communities were motivated to mobilize. Moreover, community context conditions still outperformed these more traditional factors in explaining both mobilization and nonmobilization.
CONCLUSION
Using qualitative case studies and fs/QCA, we have shown that, when counterfactual cases are included, prevailing social movement theories fail to explain opposition to energy infrastructure projects. Contrary to the assumptions of those who emphasize capability using resource mobilization and political opportunity frameworks, our results indicate that high levels of resources and political opportunity are not necessary for mobilization. A proper account of mobilization should thus include a combination of factors that take capability and motivation into account. On the basis of our earlier argument that capability matters less for movements not exclusively related to complaints about disadvantage, this result should not be surprising. Community mobilization in opposition to energy infrastructure projects should not critically relate to relative disadvantage (as in rights movements) but to whether a community thinks that the project is threatening in the first place.
Furthermore, we argue that any model aiming to explain movement emergence must properly specify motivation. Approaches that measure threat directly are inadequate because communities consider objective factors in different contexts and make different judgments about whether potential threats are worthy of opposition. For example, while the nuclear project in Claiborne County and the cogeneration project in Whatcom County posed high levels of threat, people in these communities did not think about them this way. Opposition by Claiborne locals was motivated by a quest to reap more financial benefits. While external activists in the Claiborne case framed their argument in terms of "meltdown," this idea did not catch on among locals who had experience living near a safe plant. The lack of opposition in Whatcom stemmed from community support of an existing, and lucrative, industry. High levels of project-related threat do not correspond with mobilizing communities more often than with nonmobilizing communities.
We replace direct measures of the threat with community context conditions that we expect will influence judgments about both the threats and benefits related to the project. Specifically, we are interested in community experiences and salient issues that will affect how information about the project is received. We find that having a similar industry or economic interest in the project, rooted in economic hardship, is a good indicator that a community will not mobilize. In fact, the combination of these factors alone corresponds with nonmobilization outcomes almost as well as when we add information about capability. However, in terms of explaining nonmobilization, our results suggest that the absence of civic capacity and the absence of political opportunity are important.
Community context also helps distinguish between various pathways to mobilization. Communities with no similar industry and low levels of economic hardship mobilize given the presence of high levels of civic capacity.
This finding aligns with classic social movement reasoning. These communities are motivated to act and have sufficient capability to do so. For communities that we expect to be unmotivated because of familiarity with the industry or economic interest in benefits, prior oppositional experience appears to be a strong indicator of motivation, and these communities mobilize despite low levels of civic capacity.
Whether one is interested in mobilization or nonmobilization, our results show that incorporating both motivation and capability is critical to understanding movement emergence. Furthermore, there must be a social psychological mechanism behind motivation to explain why similar threats can produce such different reactions. We emphasize the fact that similar contextual conditions can shape the judgments of large groups of people within a community. In our cases, the presence or absence of a similar industry and the high or low levels of interest in the benefits of a new development can shade the lenses through which a community evaluates a proposal. The facts about the issue, such as the type of project proposed or the potential risks to safety and property, are understood within a broader context and evaluated differently across communities.
While we look specifically at opposition to energy infrastructure projects, our theoretical contributions could be extended to other types of movements, especially when uncertainty is less related to community capability and more related to motivation. Many policy proposals fit this category. Consider climate change mitigation. The decision to mobilize for climate change mitigation depends on whether people believe that such policies will work and whether the economic drawbacks are worth potential benefits. These beliefs are likely influenced by the facts and figures one chooses to believe and emphasize, which, in turn, are shaped by past experiences and desires for the future. These experiences and desires will be shaped by local context. For example, the Chinese evaluate proposals for curbing climate change by assessing how they will fit into a rapid economic growth model, whereas Americans contend with entrenched energy interests and energy-intensive lifestyles.
In a continually globalizing context, where coordinated action across communities is required to make a real difference around issues such as climate change, workers' rights, and nuclear proliferation (to name a few), future research must take seriously the fact that local context shapes evaluations of a situation and thus motivation to act. We hope that others will take Walder's (2009) pleas seriously and analyze both motivation and capability to understand movement emergence. Further, we are optimistic that our methodology and approach can be applied to a great number of issues, so that movement theories can be tested in "at-risk" communities to better explain when and where people are likely to act and when and where they will remain quiescent. To score this condition, we used information on several types of activity expressing opposition to the proposal: letters in local newspapers, speakers at EIS meetings, coordinated appearances at EIS meetings, public meetings organized by the opposition, protests, and lawsuits. Fuzzy-set scores for each of these activities correspond to the percentile ranking the community had for the variables. For example, Aiken County, South Carolina, had 12 oppositional letters published in the newspaper, which put it in the 60th percentile among the 20 communities. After normalizing the variables by scoring them individually, we added the scores and reassigned fuzzy-set scores using the same method of percentile ranking. This furnished an overall score for the volume of oppositional activity. For example, the sum for Aiken County was 2 (.6 1 .6 1 0 1 .2 1 .6), which put it in the 60th percentile for the volume of oppositions with a corresponding volume score of .6. We then assigned a final score in the following manner: if a community had evidence of both collective action (coordinated appearances, public meetings, or protests) and noninstitutional action (public meetings or protests), it automatically fell in the set of communities that mobilized against the proposal. It was then assigned its volume score, although communities with volume scores less than .5 automatically received a score of .6. Communities with evidence of collective action or noninstitutional activity but not both simply received their volume score as long as it ranged between 0 and .5, putting them out of the set, but not completely. Communities with neither collective action nor noninstitutional action received a score of 0, putting them completely out of the set of communities that mobilized. Table B1 presents the numbers.
Threat
The literature on risk provides guidance about how threatening people find different types of projects. From this literature (Slovic 1987) we assign fuzzy scores to different types of projects: nuclear facilities receive a 1, open-loop LNG projects receive a .8 because of additional environmental threats they pose, all other LNG projects and oil refineries receive a score of .6, hydroelectric receives a .4, and wind receives a score of .2. To capture the threats related to the proximity of projects to residential and nonindustrial areas, we scored proximity of the project to these areas. Projects zero miles away received a 1, projects one or two miles away scored a .8, projects six miles away received a .6, projects 11-15 miles away scored a .4, and the project 38 miles away scored a .2. For both of these conditions no project scores a 0 because, relative to having nothing done, they should all be considered threatening or risky. After scoring both aspects, we added the scores and assigned new fuzzy final scores by giving the highest a score of 1, the next highest .8, and so on. See table B2.
Political Opportunity
To score this condition we used three variables: the percentage of the decision-making body that was made up of elected officials, whether or not any of these officials were up for reelection, and the jurisdiction of the decisionmaking body. A fuzzy-set score was assigned for the set of communities with elected officials in the decision-making body using the method of percentile ranking. For example, with 69% of the decision-making body composed of elected officials, Brazoria County, Texas, was in the 80th percentile with a corresponding score of .8. Communities received a 1 on reelection if the elected officials were up for reelection during the review process; oth- NOTE.-These data come from the authors' expert knowledge of the case generated through newspaper analysis and field interviews. erwise they received a 0. For jurisdiction a community receives a 1 if the elected officials were local, .6 if there was at least one local elected official, and 0 if there were no local elected officials on the decision-making body. After normalizing the variables by scoring them individually, we added the scores together and reassigned fuzzy-set scores using the same method of percentile ranking described above. See table B3.
Civic Capacity
To score this condition, we used three variables: the number of nonprofits per 1,000 residents, the percentage of people over age 25 with at least a college education (bachelor's degree), and voter turnout in the presidential election prior to the proposal. Fuzzy-set scores for all three variables correspond to the percentile ranking the community had for the variables. For example, Aiken County had 1.77 nonprofits per 1,000 residents, which put it in the 20th percentile, scoring a .2 for this measure of civic capacity among the 20 communities. After normalizing the variables by scoring them individually, we added the scores together and reassigned fuzzy-set scores using the same method of percentile ranking. For example, the sum of nonprofits, education, and voter turnout for Aiken County was 1.2 (.2 1 .4 1 .6), which put it in the 40th percentile for civic capacity with a corresponding final score of . 4 . See table B4.
Similar Industry
Scores were assigned to this condition using the following criteria: communities with extensive, similar, or related industry received a 1 and all other communities received a 0. See table B5. 
Community Response to Environmental Risk Previous Oppositional Experience
Fuzzy-set scores were assigned for this condition using the following criteria: communities with no prior oppositional experience received a score of 0, placing them out of the set; communities that had opposed the exact same type of project received a 1; communities scored a .8 if they had previous oppositional experience with a similar project; and finally, communities scored .6 if they experienced a major dispute regarding land use (but not specifically energy) in recent years. See table B6. To score this condition, we used two variables: the percentage of people in the labor force in the community who were unemployed, and median household income. Fuzzy-set scores for both unemployment and median household income correspond to the percentile ranking the community had for the variables. For example, Aiken County had 5.9% unemployment, which put it in the 40th percentile for closeness among the 20 communities scoring .4. After normalizing the variables by scoring them individually, we added the scores together and reassigned fuzzy-set scores using the same method of percentile ranking. For example, the sum of unemployment and median household income for Aiken County was 1 (.4 1 .6), which put it in the 20th percentile for economic hardship with a corresponding final score of . 
